



Royal United Services Institute  
of Victoria Inc.

Promoting National Security and Defence

*A Constitutional Body of the Royal United Services Institute of Australia*

Patron: The Honourable Alex Chernov AO QC  
Governor of Victoria



Victoria Barracks  
Ground Floor 'H' Block  
256-310 St Kilda Road  
Southbank, Victoria 3006

Phone: (03) 9282 5918  
Fax: (03) 9282 5857  
Email: rusi.vic@defence.gov.au

ABN 46 648 764 477

# RUSI VIC NEWSLETTER

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Editor: Martin Holme

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## *Season's Greetings*

*And Best Wishes for a Happy, Peaceful  
and Prosperous New Year*

***Remembering especially the 3300  
Australian Defence Force members  
serving on deployments overseas***

*For your holiday reading, included in this issue is the  
full text of RADM Goldrick's Blamey Oration, entitled  
'Some Issues of Command in the Twenty First Century'  
delivered at the Shrine of Remembrance on 19 May.*



## Cyberlinks

RUSI AUST (inc Victoria)	<a href="http://www.rusi.org.au">www.rusi.org.au</a>
RUSI Whitehall	<a href="http://www.rusi.org">www.rusi.org</a>
Dept of Defence	<a href="http://defence.gov.au">defence.gov.au</a>
Aust Strategic Policy Institute	<a href="http://www.aspi.org.au">www.aspi.org.au</a>
Australia Defence Association	<a href="http://www.ada.asn.au">www.ada.asn.au</a>
RAAF Assoc 'Williams Foundation	<a href="http://www.williamsfoundation.org.au">www.williamsfoundation.org.au</a>
Defence Reserves Association	<a href="http://www.dra.org.au">www.dra.org.au</a>
Defence Force Welfare Association	<a href="http://www.dfw.org.au">www.dfw.org.au</a>
Military History and Heritage Victoria	<a href="http://www.mhhv.org.au">www.mhhv.org.au</a>

## From The Secretary:

### Captain Martin Holme

Another eventful year draws to a close. We have had again some excellent speakers at our Lunchtime Addresses and BRIG Ian Lillie and COL Marcus Fielding deserve our thanks for the effort they put in to secure them. The October speaker, following the Annual general Meeting, was COL Mike Annett, CEO RSL Victoria who gave a most interesting account of the current work of the RSL and where it is headed in the years ahead.

The November and last Address for the year was given by COL Rob Manton, recently returned from a posting to the UN in New York. Again, this gave us a fascinating look into the workings of that sometimes enigmatic organisation.

As is mentioned elsewhere, our traditional Christmas Drinks will be on Tuesday, 13 December, in the RUSI Office, Ground Floor 'H' Block, Victoria Barracks, from 1430hrs to 1600hrs. We hope that some of you will find the time to be with us for some Christmas Cheer in these somewhat gloomy times. The occasion also gives us the opportunity to thank those in Victoria Barracks who support us during the year. **Please** let me know if you intend to be present.

I would like to thank again Glen and Jill Doyle for their continued help in assisting with our mail-outs. Their cheerful and efficient support on these occasions is greatly appreciated.

I would also like to thank LTCOL Ian George for his enormous contribution to our cause during the year. His cheerful endeavours on our behalf go way beyond his role as Treasurer. His assistance and advice to me and to the Membership as a whole is greatly valued. On behalf of us all, I also wish him all the best for his forthcoming knee operation.

I also thank AIRCDRE Mike Rawlinson for his help during the year in the production of these Newsletters.

The office will officially close from Thursday 15 December and re-open on Monday 30 January 2012.

I wish our readers all the best for a happy and safe Festive Season and I look forward to seeing you again in 2012.

### Future Program Dates

13 Dec Christmas Drinks (1430hrs)

15 Dec Office Closes

### 2012

30 Jan Office re-opens

23 Feb Lunchtime Address – Victoria Barracks

Speaker – Dr Timothy Lynch, University of Melbourne  
'War as American Public Policy  
– Why the United States is different'

28 Mar Lunchtime Address – Victoria Barracks  
Speaker to be advised

26 Apr Lunchtime Address – Victoria Barracks  
Speaker to be advised

### New Member

Since our last issue we welcome the following new Member:

MAJ T. Kanellos

### Vale

We record with deep regret the passing of:

MAJ P.R. Gower



Martin Holme speaks at the Annual Luncheon  
'Holme thoughts from abroad'

## From The President:

### Commander Warren Kemp



Our secretary, Captain Martin Holme, and I were invited to call on our new Patron, His Excellency The Honourable Alex Chernov, AO, QC, Governor of Victoria, on Tuesday 15<sup>th</sup> November and we were received with great courtesy and goodwill. His Excellency is not a military man, but he expressed considerable interest in the history and development of our Institute and stated that he considered the Royal United Services Institute of Victoria to be an important pillar in the establishment of this State. He was very interested to hear about our Institute and indicated his desire to visit our premises and perhaps to take part in some of our activities, to which he is most welcome and indeed would be following in the footsteps of many of his predecessors from the time of Lord Hopetoun, Governor of Victoria at the foundation of the Institute in 1890 and Chairman of some of the early meetings. On your behalf, I thanked him for his interest and support which are very welcome to us and much appreciated.

The Annual General Meeting was held at the Defence Plaza on Thursday 27<sup>th</sup> October, when the Council was re-elected unchanged from last year. This is a good sign of satisfaction by the membership and confidence in the ability of Council to manage the affairs of the Institute. In this regard, I would add my personal thanks and appreciation for the services and co-operation of our secretary, Martin Holme, our Honorary Treasurer, Ian George, and our Honorary Auditor, Colin Kirkwood. Lastly, my thanks and appreciation are extended to the three Vice Presidents and to all members of Council for the support that they have given to me during the year and for their continuing efforts and service to RUSI Victoria, given willingly and in a voluntary capacity.

On Monday 10<sup>th</sup> October, the Council Meeting was held at "The Heroes", Toorak RSL Club and followed by a Luncheon to welcome and install three new 'Councillors Emeritus'. Those recognised for their sterling services over many years were Colonel Mark Richards, past Vice President, Major Bob Prewett, past Councillor and Flying Officer Neville Wright, past Honorary Treasurer. Unfortunately, Neville was unable to attend, but Mark and Bob were duly inducted in the company of the other Councillors Emeritus and received their certificates

attesting to this fine occasion, which was enjoyed by all of those present.

The annual Seafarers Service was held at St Paul's Cathedral on Sunday 16<sup>th</sup> October and another Service was held at Queenscliff on Sunday 20<sup>th</sup> November, to remember those Sailors who lost their lives when HMAS Goorangi was sunk in a collision at The Heads, while on active service.

Open Day at HMAS Cerberus on Sunday 23<sup>rd</sup> October attracted a large crowd despite the inclement weather. The attendance was more than 6000 visitors, who were entertained by the Naval Band and instructed by numerous displays and other naval activities normally carried out at sea and therefore not usually observed by the public.

Our Annual Luncheon was held on Tuesday 8<sup>th</sup> November at the William Angliss Restaurant, which is the convenient location that we used at our inaugural luncheon last year. The meal was excellently prepared and served by the post graduate hospitality students and complemented by another short address by our irrepressible secretary, entitled "Holme thoughts from Abroad", believe it or not – about his exploits in Gibraltar! These Annual Luncheons are quite informal and have been greatly enjoyed by the Members who have attended, so make a note in your diary for the next Luncheon on Tuesday 13<sup>th</sup> November 2012 - an occasion not to be missed!

The final Council Meeting for 2011 will be held on Tuesday 13<sup>th</sup> December, followed by Open House from 1430 until 1600 in our Office and Library. I hope to see as many members as possible on the day, but for those unable to call in, I send my best wishes for Christmas and the festive season and also for a happy and successful New Year.

Yours Aye,  
Warren



Annual General Meeting October 2011

## The Chatham House Rule

The term 'Chatham House Rule' is frequently used when issues concerning Strategy, Intelligence or sensitive policy are being canvassed or discussed in a public forum by people of note, particularly officials, who have a specific knowledge in these areas. They can speak more openly and freely if the Chatham House Rule applies at the meeting. For this reason, members attending RUSI meetings are likely to receive more frank and accurate information than is generally available.

We are often asked what the term actually means and so it was thought timely to make some explanatory comments.

The Chatham House Rule is a guideline to the handling of sensitive material that may be included in lectures and presentations given at various forums.

The Rule originated with the Royal Institute of International Affairs, which is located at Chatham House in London. The Rule, which was formulated as the Chatham House Rule of Confidentiality in 1927, states:

*When a meeting or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant may be revealed.*

The Rule is not legally binding in any way, and indeed the only sanction that exists for a breach lies with the organisation sponsoring the lecture (members or others may be excluded from future meetings), or the lecturer, who may refuse in future to speak to the organisation.

### Comment:

At RUSI VIC Lectures, the Chatham House Rule normally applies and for particularly sensitive presentations the Chairman will remind the audience of their obligations under the Rule.

At seminars, the Rule may apply throughout the seminar or may be invoked for individual speakers as appropriate. During presentations when speakers are effectively making a public announcement, it will be stated that the Chatham House Rule does not apply.

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## Q & A (from Chatham House)

### Q. When was the Rule devised?

A. In 1927 and refined in 1992 and 2002.

### Q. Should one refer to the Chatham House Rule or the Chatham House Rules?

A. There is only one Rule.

### Q. What are the benefits of using the Rule?

A. It allows people to speak as individuals, and to express views that may not be those of their organizations, and therefore it encourages free discussion. People usually feel more relaxed if they don't have to worry about their reputation or the implications if they are publicly quoted.

### Q. How is the Rule enforced?

A. Chatham House can take disciplinary action against one of its members who breaks the Rule. Not all organizations that use the Rule have sanctions. The Rule then depends for its success on being seen as morally binding.

### Q. Is the Rule used for all meetings at Chatham House?

A. Not often for Member Events; more frequently for smaller research meetings, for example where work in progress is discussed or when subject matter is politically sensitive. Most Chatham House conferences are under the Rule.

### Q. Who uses the Rule these days?

A. It is widely used by local government and commercial organizations as well as research organizations.

### Q. Can participants in a meeting be named as long as what is said is not attributed?

A. It is important to think about the spirit of the Rule. For example, sometimes speakers need to be named when publicizing the meeting. The Rule is more about the dissemination of the information after the event - nothing should be done to identify, either explicitly or implicitly, who said what.

### Q. Can you say within a report what you yourself said at a meeting under the Chatham House Rule?

A. Yes if you wish to do so.

### Q. Can a list of attendees at the meeting be published?

A. No - the list of attendees should not be circulated beyond those participating in the meeting.

### Q. Can I 'tweet' whilst at an event under the Chatham House Rule?

A. The Rule can be used effectively on social media sites such as Twitter as long as the person tweeting or messaging reports only what was said at an event and does not identify - directly or indirectly - the speaker or another participant. This consideration should always guide the way in which event information is disseminated - online as well as offline. •



## RUSI OF VICTORIA

### THE BLAMEY ORATION 2011

Thursday 19 MAY 2011

#### 'SOME ISSUES OF COMMAND IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY'

#### REAR ADMIRAL JAMES GOLDRICK AM CSC RAN

Commander Australian Defence College



I am honoured to have been invited to deliver the Blamey Oration to the Royal United Services Institute of Victoria. In delivering this address, I am going to provide you with my thoughts on some issues of command in the twenty first century, with what I hope will be an appropriate fusing of future, present and past. Nearly sixty years after the Field Marshal's death, it seems that so much has changed in terms of command and control of military operations that it is easy to fall into the trap of thinking that nothing of the past has relevance or that we have nothing to learn from our predecessors and forebears. Nevertheless, it is a trap that we must avoid at all costs, even as we grapple with the implications of change in every aspect of human activity. I will admit to you that I have very mixed feelings in my regard for Blamey as a man and as a commander, but I am also acutely aware that any survey of the challenges that he faced and the problems that he overcame would acknowledge that he had to operate in environments of intense complexity and uncertainty and that, most particularly in his role of Commander of the Second AIF, he maintained a keen understanding of the requirement of what is perhaps the most important of the principles of war – maintenance of the aim, but with a shrewd understanding that the aim may change with the circumstances.

Providing a coherent perspective on the issues of command is no small challenge. I will say at the outset that I can only provide a personal perspective and one that is inevitably limited, albeit my own experience encompasses both multi-national and inter-agency, whole of government operations. I may not be a *simple* sailor, but I nonetheless remain a sailor – as each of us, no matter how we grow and develop, remains a product of our professional culture. All of us who are given command responsibilities need to remember that we come with baggage which we cannot ever fully drop – and we have to remember that, in particular, when we

are dealing with complex issues and with people from other national and professional cultures.

However, I can say that my perspective has not only been informed by some four years in seagoing command and two years in higher operational command – as well as nearly eight years in education and training commands – but also refined by my role over the last three years in the conduct of the highest levels of professional military education in the ADF. Much of what I will say today I have presented to and discussed with the future senior leaders of our three Services, as well as many of their overseas equivalents.

I will declare at this point that I do set one key requirement for effective commanders and that is to be self-aware, conscious of their own strengths and their own weaknesses and determined to embark and maintain themselves on a personal journey of development and understanding. I'll say more about this later.

Let me now set a further context for my personal perspective. Firstly, while I am in no doubt that the nature of war is changing, I am uncomfortable with the impression that I often have from military and strategic theorists (and from people *trying* to be military and strategic theorists – which is not the same thing) that this should somehow be a surprise to us. War is, as Clausewitz pointed out nearly two hundred years ago, a chameleon, and it alters form constantly as the human condition evolves. To find the answer in any aspect of war is simply to invite the adversary to change the question. *We are* going to be surprised by the changes in war as they occur. What we should not be surprised about is that there are such changes – or that they will continue.

I am in sympathy, although though not in complete agreement with General Sir Rupert Smith's contention in his book *The Utility of Force* that the age of industrial war is at an end, because I think that this is to confine the idea of 'industrial warfare' to iron and steam and to apply an essentially post-modernist Western European perspective to a world which is not post-modern elsewhere. My view is that the prospect of nation states engaging each other with non-nuclear weaponry remains and that crises may arise and conventional weapons be utilized with very little warning. National rivalries continue in many parts of the world.

What also will therefore remain, in my view, is the implicit idea of industrial warfare; that, if they judge it necessary, some nation states will exploit their economic strength and the technological capabilities directed by the state to stage such engagements. The difference to me is that to the 'iron and steam' of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has long been added the electronic dimension and this electronic dimension now, in the form of cyber warfare, has the capacity to be exploited to a degree that we are only coming to understand, both in its 'hard' and 'soft' aspects. Perhaps cyber warfare can be considered in some ways an effort to develop a new and electronic version of the strategy of the indirect approach.

All this said about 'industrial warfare' and indeed 'post-industrial warfare', I do, however, agree to a greater extent with Rupert Smith's contention that 'war amongst the people' will be a significant manifestation of conflict in the immediate future and that we need to prepare commanders for all the complexities and challenges that this involves.

To an extent, I am also impatient with the idea that the nature of war, as opposed to the mechanics of its practice, has changed because of the increasing capabilities of communications and information technology. There has always been a tension between the man on the spot and the commander at a distance and there have always been problems in determining who has the more accurate and complete picture of events and thus who should be making the decisions.

I also grow somewhat impatient with *some* of what is said about the merging of the levels of warfare and the emergence of the strategic corporal (or private). As a naval officer, I have to tell you that I regard the idea of three distinct levels of warfare (strategic, operational and tactical) as a useful construct, but one that was developed in the context of state on state land warfare and thus has certain limitations, even in the context of 'industrial warfare'. The operational and the tactical – and arguably the strategic – at sea have always been intertwined and the concepts of distance and resources hitherto very different than on land. What individual units and platforms do can matter, both locally and further afield – and, in a maritime context, it always has.

It is also a historical fact that small incidents have *always* had strategic effects, albeit usually more slowly than the present day. To give just one example, the war of Jenkin's Ear in the eighteenth century between England and Spain was founded on the pretext of the mistreatment of a single English merchant captain, whatever the wider strategic and commercial issues at stake. It is a legend that the Captain's ear, which had been cut off by a Spanish *garda costa* officer, was passed from hand to hand as evidence in the British parliament, but is a fact that the injury was used by Britain as a useful pretext for war.

In my view what is critical to the compression and fusion of the levels of warfare is not the fact of connectivity, nor indeed its immediacy – a study of the impact of the telegraph and the trans-oceanic cable in the nineteenth century would show you that information exchange could occur, if not instantaneously, then still at a speed which exceeded that of the abilities of many to cope. And that in the nineteenth century remote local commanders complained bitterly about the issues raised by their connection to the 'umbilical cord' of the telegraph.

The greater challenge that I see in the present day and the immediate future is that of the extent and of multiplicity of the means by which information arrives. Information can derive from so many sources and move in so many directions that it creates extraordinary challenges. Furthermore, it also moves in such large amounts and so unremittingly that command organisations and command structures and systems need to be configured so that not only are personnel and commanders not overwhelmed but that they are not ground down by that lack of remission.

And one of the great associated conundrums, perhaps a greater one than any questions of bandwidth, is how best to display data in ways that assist commanders at each level to deal with the problems that they are meant to focus on themselves, while also not restricting their access to data that may allow them to perceive a connection or a critical issue vital to their success. Any researcher in any academic field will tell you – and there have been studies done – that something like 30% of research discoveries are the result of serendipity, not previous intent. In war, successful identification of the 'Golden Moment' probably has at least the same proportion of accidental discovery.

One of the challenges that developers of command decision support systems face is moving from the paradigm of what is fundamentally a computerized version of Second World War area air defence coordination and control systems – based inherently on platforms and individual units – to knowledge systems which actually assist in making decisions about what are much more complex problems in generally much more ambiguous circumstances than a straight forward air or sea battle.

Now, if I can suggest another way of thinking about conflict and its different aspects, it is to propose that the levels of war can be better divided into the remote and the proximate and that the distinction – and indeed the tension – fundamentally depends upon the personal physical risk that the protagonists are experiencing as they make decisions and take actions and the difference between this physical risk and that being experienced by remote authority. And I should add that in my advice to future commanders I emphasise that this distinction needs to be kept in mind at all times by those who are in rear area commands and headquarters. To be fair, it also needs to be borne in mind by those who are in the front line, because each headquarters is subject to

pressures that may be intense but which may not be at all obvious to outside observers. Above all, each person needs to make some effort to put themselves into others' shoes, no matter how highly stressed the situation that they face.

I will also make a point in relation to phenomena which are considered to be recent developments, such as the 'four thousand mile screwdriver'. The fact is, as I have already implied, that commanders, indeed politicians leading governments, have always intervened when they felt that they had identified the critical point and where they believed that they possessed a better understanding of the issues and what needed to be done than the local commander. Marlborough, Napoleon and Wellington all did it personally on the battlefield, if necessary, more recent commanders by methods more appropriate to their own situations. The tensions between the US Government and the commanders of the US armies in the Civil War are a fascinating insight into civil-military relations in a democratic society under pressure. Nearly a century later, President Truman fired General MacArthur very much because a situation had evolved in which the US Government had a fundamentally different – and much more global and coherent – view of the way ahead than the Theatre Commander. I'll also say – and the great land commanders that I have mentioned exemplified it (as did Nelson and Cunningham to name two great leaders at sea) – that successful commanders also know when to withdraw from their focus on a vital point and resume their contemplation of the full picture of the operations of their command.

The point is that the really difficult judgement to make is whether the information available to the higher commander actually does give a more accurate picture – and whether the use to which the higher commander puts that information and the way in which he employs it to exercise command is appropriate within the context of the commander's overall mission.

In terms of modern information technology, perhaps one of the key skills that need to be developed in our people – and this is not confined to commanders, let alone senior officers – is an ability to assess the reliability and quality of information in order to place the appropriate weight on it as a support to decision making. One could term this 'google wisdom' – as any user of the internet should know, the first few entries in any listing provided by a search engine are not necessarily the ones which should be relied upon. Such an ability to judge applies to much more than just the internet (and, to be fair, to many more than just the military). But the more information there is available and the more sources from which it derives, the more important this becomes.

It is perhaps making the judgement about who has the best quality of picture and thus the best situational awareness correctly which will be one of the key challenges for senior commanders, not only in what they do themselves but in how they assist their own

seniors and governments to respond to situations and provide higher direction. Commanders must be able to maintain a 'clear head' and, perhaps above all, an ability to discern whether the aim must be maintained or whether what is happening around them is changing the very nature of that aim. And this is perhaps one matter on which we can look back to Blamey, particularly in the Mediterranean in 1941.

It is worthwhile to dwell further on this issue. It is fair to say that any commitment by a nation to involve itself in a conflict, while obviously often made at speed and in response to chaotic events that were rapidly unfolding and which were not always fully understood, has been determined as the result of a large number of factors and what is often a delicate and highly complex balance of judgements which were probably not all fully quantifiable, either at the time or even in retrospect.

The challenge for decision makers, commanders and higher advisers is, above all, to be 'clear headed' in such circumstances. For the military in meeting this demand, it is important here to understand that making a success of this depends upon possession to some degree at least of Clausewitz's concept of 'genius', the quality which allows the commander to make the correct decision no matter how ambiguous and uncertain the situation and no matter what the stresses being applied to the individual and the group. Please understand that, despite the normal connotations of the term in English, Clausewitz always believed that a commander's genius not only derived from his basic qualities and intelligence, but on the extent to which they had consciously prepared themselves for command by intensive study and reflection on the problems of war. Much of the talk about 'genius' has tended to fix on its importance in decision making relating to a particular event on the battlefield. I will tell you that I think that it applies just as much to the development and direction of a campaign in a dynamic situation.

As part of this, there needs to be an understanding that end states – and the paths to their achievement – are rarely pure and never simple. There is an accompanying understanding that both ends and means – and thus ways – evolve. I don't mean here to over-emphasise the value of pragmatism. That can easily lapse into the opportunism which has itself generated many strategic failures in the past – witness the history of the German Army in the Second World War. But I do mean to assert the need for realism. I think that this is something that Blamey (and the other senior officers of the Second AIF) generally demonstrated very well in the 1940-41 period.

This means that commanders need to be absolutely clear on their responsibility to explain the issues (both upwards to their own leadership and downwards to their subordinates), provide advice and suggest the most effective course of action – with all the risks inherent on any course of action made very clear. Speaking truth to power is an apt expression in these circumstances. Politicians who have had to fight and win elections in difficult circumstances tend, once they have overcome

any initial cultural discomfort at their involvement in military affairs and military conflicts, to recognize many of the same factors at work. I have had it pointed out to me by veterans (and I don't mean just observers) of the political scene that many of Clausewitz's concepts resonate very strongly for those involved in a close election, most notably that of friction!

This approach and this outlook must continue when commanders translate the direction that they receive into action. In most, no, in all circumstances the planning and the execution will involve the management of a multitude of relationships and interaction with many other authorities and organisations. There are a number of terms for the processes involved here, but the one that I think best conveys to the layman the requirement is that of 'orchestration'.

Achieving effective 'orchestration' I see as very much dependent upon the development of a collective understanding of the nature of the problem and what needs to be done amongst all those involved, political, military and civilian, whether in coalition or not. I believe that military leaders have a key role to play in generating such a collective understanding – across and down as well as upwards. But some things need to be borne well in mind. First and most important, the military perspective is not and never can be the whole perspective. The second is that the perspective held will change as the understanding of all those involved extends and matures through the process of interaction with other authorities, organisations and nations.

There is another especially important aspect to all this for a commander. Particularly in insurgency operations, we talk about the necessity to win the 'hearts and minds' of the local population. One of the additional challenges which commanders must bear in mind, notably but not only in the complex environments of 'war amongst the people' is the need to win and hold the 'hearts and minds' of the personnel under command. This is a key command challenge, and it is one that is more intense than ever before because access to so many sources of information is now available to practically every person at every point in the command chain – and often immediately.

Because this may to be dealt with at the same time that an internal understanding as to the direction to take has yet to be developed by the commander himself. From the start there is a requirement for the quality of leadership that will take people with the commander and keep them comfortable with the journey – even when the commander is unsure of the ultimate destination and have yet to settle that internal understanding that I mentioned. I have had the experience, in taking over the maritime interception operation in the Persian Gulf in 2002, of having to spend a lot of time trying to understand what the problem really was in maintaining the sanctions program and preventing smuggling, while we continued operations and then, having developed that understanding, take both subordinates (some of whom were actually senior to me in rank) *and* higher

command on the path that I wanted – which was fundamentally different to the way that things had been done before.

But this brings me back to what I think is a key product of the reflection and study that recommend to embryo commanders and the self-awareness that I want them to have. I have already noted its importance in relation to being clear headed, but I want to spend some more time on this issue.

What I am talking about is what I would call a 'sensitivity' that derives from all this effort. It could be called many things – one of which is the Army's 'eye for the ground' which the Duke of Wellington famously possessed, the quality of always knowing what lay on the other side of the hill, even when he hadn't seen it himself. This then leads to the ability to seize the moment – what is termed the *coup d'oeil*, the ability to sum up a situation, decide immediately what to do and then do it. Carl von Clausewitz, the author on *On War*, spent a lot of time trying to define this quality. (One of his terms for it, as I have already mentioned, translates into 'genius', but importantly as he believed that a great measure could be learned as well as being inherent it isn't really 'genius' as popularly understood in the English language. If, however, we are to take the definition derived from Carlyle's biography of *Frederick the Great* that genius is the infinite capacity for taking pains, then the word may well be the right one.)

I myself believe that the quality is summed up by the term 'professional mastery' and the extent to which a commander possesses it depends upon personal talent *and* what has derived from both the commander's own experience and that of others. One of the points about the Duke of Wellington is that he spent many years *consciously* developing his ability to be able to judge and predict terrain as a force multiplier. He didn't just happen upon the skill. Commanders need to work out for themselves what are the modern equivalents to predicting terrain as a commander for them to practise and hone their expertise upon. As I have already implied, 'google wisdom' is definitely one of those equivalents.

So if I can summarise my thinking, it is that, more than ever, commanders and would-be commanders need to embark upon a personal journey of development and reflection, that they must develop highly sophisticated techniques of accessing and analyzing information, that they need to maintain themselves on that journey as they gain rank and that they need also, and this is in some ways the hardest thing, to maintain the pace of that journey even as they grapple with the complex and even 'wicked' problems that will arise during their command appointments. In other words they must never stop learning. As I put it to the graduating midshipmen and officer cadets of the Australian Defence Force Academy, the earlier that the start of the journey is made, the better. And if they haven't started already, now is a really good time!

*Continued Page 9*



I will finish at this point. As I promised, my presentation has been a consideration of themes and problems for commanders and would-be commanders, not a prescription for campaign planning and the conduct of battles. If I can conclude, one reality that I tell the students of the Australian Defence College that they need to keep close to their hearts is that victory tends to go not to the one who makes the least mistakes, but rather to they who recognise their mistakes before the adversary does their own. •

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## Maritime Matters

On the face of it 2011 has not been a good year for naval shipbuilding in Australia or for manufacturing. There have been ongoing problems with the Collins Class submarines and decisions regarding their replacements, unforeseen delays in building the new Air Warfare Destroyers, and unprecedented maintenance problems with the RAN's Amphibious Ships. On manufacturing generally, companies have been lamenting the effects of the two speed economy and suggesting to the federal government that some variant of protection or other assistance is needed.

The big resource State of Western Australia is booming. While the news from the West is dominated by mammoth mining and offshore gas ventures, there is also some good news coming from the Henderson ship building precinct at Rockingham, south of Perth. Austal Ships has contracts with the US Department of Defense to build a revolutionary new class of naval vessel for the USN.

**Mike Rawlinson**

Information on Austal Ships and the US Littoral Combat Ship is from Wikipedia.

## Austal Ships

Austal is an Australian company that specializes in the design and construction of aluminium vessels. Its main products include passenger and freight ferries, luxury yachts and military vessels. Austal commenced operations in 1988 with a vision to build high quality commercial vessels for the international market. By the company's fifth anniversary Austal had become the world's leading manufacturer of 40 metre passenger catamarans and the dominant supplier to Asia.

It was in Hong Kong as early as 1993 that Austal introduced gas turbine propulsion and the first two installations of the Austal developed motion control system. The success in Asia and the introduction of a range of sophisticated large vehicle-carrying fast ferries were the springboard for ongoing growth in Europe the Mediterranean and the Asia-Pacific.

Between June 2005 and February 2008, Austal completed delivery of 14 Armidale Class Patrol Boats to the Royal Australian Navy. Today, Austal is the world's largest builder of fast ferries and is proud to list amongst its customers many of the world's leading fast ferry and shipping operators.

Austal has five different production facilities, three of them on the Australian mainland, one in Margate, Tasmania, and one in the United States. The mainland Australian shipyards are located in Henderson, Western Australia; the one in the United States is based in Mobile, Alabama.

In October 2005, Austal/General Dynamics was awarded a contract to build the first of their design for a Littoral

Combat Ship. The keel of the future USS Independence (LCS-2) was laid in January 2006 at Austal USA's yard in Mobile, Alabama.

The LCS-2 was the first ship built by Austal USA for the US Navy and the Navy's first Trimaran Littoral Combat Ship. It is the first naval warship constructed in Mobile, Alabama since World War II. The basis of Austal's seaframe design is the 127 metre trimaran hull Benchijigua Express operating between the Canary Islands. Delivery of a second Austal ship (LCS-4) is scheduled for May 2012. In late 2010 the US Navy awarded contracts for Littoral combat Ships to Austal (USA) and Lockheed Martin. Austal USA (which had separated from General Dynamics) will build LCS-6 and LCS-8 in 2011. Two more per year will follow in 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015.

In November 2008, Austal won the contract to design and build the US Department of Defense's next generation high-speed catamaran, multi-use platform, the Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV), as part of a program potentially worth over US\$1.6 billion. As Prime contractor, Austal will design and construct the first 103-metre JHSV, with options for 9 additional vessels expected to be exercised between FY09 and FY13. Construction on the second ship started in September 2010. Austal now has contracts for three ships, long-lead material contracts for two ships and options for five further ships, for a total of ten.

The new JHSV is similar to the Austal-built WestPac Express operated by the US Marines for the past seven years. The JHSV will be able to carry 700 short tons (including M1 Abrams tanks) 1,200 nautical miles at an average speed of 35 knots and be able to unload at roll-on/roll-off discharge facilities. It will be 103 meters long, 28.5 meters beam with a crew of 22 to 40. The JHSV will be able to carry 300 Marines and their gear for up to four days. The USN may acquire up to two dozen of the JHSV ships over the next decade.

## United States Navy - Littoral Combat Ship

A Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is a type of relatively small surface vessel intended for operations in the littoral zone (close to shore). It is envisioned to be a networked, agile, stealthy surface combatant capable of defeating anti-access and asymmetric threats in the littorals.

The concept behind the littoral combat ship, is to create a small, fast, maneuverable and relatively inexpensive ship that is easy to reconfigure for different roles, including anti-submarine warfare, mine-countermeasures, anti-surface warfare, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, homeland defense, maritime intercept, special operations, and logistics. Due to its modular design, the LCS will be able to replace slower, more specialized ships such as minesweepers and larger assault ships.

Two ship classes are the first examples of the LCS in the US Navy the Freedom Class and the Independence Class. LCS designs are slightly smaller than the US Navy's guided missile frigates, and have been likened to corvettes of other navies. However, the LCS designs add the capabilities of a small assault transport with a flight deck and hangar large enough to base two Seahawk helicopters, the capability to recover and launch small boats from a stern ramp, and enough cargo volume and payload to deliver a small assault force with armored fighting vehicles to a roll-on/roll-off port facility. The standard armament for the LCS is an Mk 110 57mm gun. It will also be able to launch autonomous air, surface, and underwater vehicles. Although the LCS designs offer less air defence and surface-to-surface capabilities than comparable destroyers, the LCS concept emphasizes speed, flexible mission module space and a shallow draft.

The first Littoral Combat Ship, the USS Freedom (LCS-1), was commissioned on 8 November 2008. This was a mono-hull design based on the motor yacht Destriero. The second ship and first of the trimaran design, the USS Independence (LCS-2), was commissioned on 16 January 2010, in Mobile, Alabama.



(The General Dynamics Logo reflects the original Austal/General Dynamics partnership)

## USS Independence (LCS-2)

USS *Independence* (LCS-2) is the lead ship for the *Independence class* of littoral combat ships. The design competes with the Lockheed Martin designed *Freedom class*.

*Independence* is intended as a small assault transport that can take on various capabilities with the installation of mission modules. The ship is a trimaran design that can make more than 40 knots, and was delivered to the USN at the end of 2009.

The design for *Independence* (LCS 2) is based on a high-speed trimaran (Benchijigua Express) hull built by Austal (Henderson, Australia). The 127-metre surface combatant design requires a crew of 40 sailors. Although the trimaran hull increases the total surface area, it is still able to reach sustainable speeds of about 50 knots with a range of 10,000 nautical miles.

With 11,000 cubic metres of payload volume, it was designed with enough payload and volume to carry out one mission with a separate mission module in reserve, allowing the ship to do multiple missions without having to be refitted. The flight deck can support the operation of two Seahawk helicopters, multiple UAVs, or one Sea Stallion-class helicopter. The trimaran hull will allow flight operations up to sea state 5.

The *Independence* carries a default armament for self-defence, and command and control. However unlike traditional fighting ships with fixed armament such as guns and missiles, tailored mission modules can be configured for one mission package at a time. Modules may consist of manned aircraft, unmanned vehicles, off-board sensors, or mission-manning detachments.

The helm is controlled by joysticks instead of traditional steering wheels. The main engines are two gas turbines driving four water jets.

The interior volume and payload is greater than some destroyers and is sufficient to serve as a high-speed transport and maneuver platform. The mission bay is 1,410 m<sup>2</sup> and takes up most of the deck below the hangar and flight deck.

In addition to cargo or container-sized mission modules, the bay can carry four lanes of multiple Strykers, armored Humvees, and their associated troops. An elevator allows air transport of packages the size of a 20-foot-long (6.1 m) shipping container that can be moved into the mission bay while at sea. A side access ramp allows for vehicle roll-on/roll-off loading to a dock and allows the ship to transport the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle.





## Library News

### Newly Acquired Publications

At the suggestion of several members, newly acquired publications will be displayed prominently for several weeks before they are 'hidden' in the shelves. All such items are available for loan.

### Member Discounts

Members may be interested in an offer negotiated by us from Australian Military History Publications. This firm is well known for their list of books on Australian military history. Its list includes many titles published for the Army History Unit and there are many titles of naval and air force interest. It also has a shop selling new military titles from other publishers and second-hand books called The War Book Shop. The proprietor has offered 10% discount on all orders by RUSI members – all you have to do is to tell him you're a member.

AMHP is at 13 Veronica Place, Loftus NSW 2232, telephone 02 9542 6771. Its internet site is [www.warbooks.com.au](http://www.warbooks.com.au)

A similar discount of 10% is available on all books at the antiquarian bookshop Bradstreet's Books at Shop 9-10, Railway Arcade, 660A Glenferrie Rd Hawthorn 3122, near Glenferrie Station. Its telephone is 03 9819 3600 and email [bradstreets@bigpond.com](mailto:bradstreets@bigpond.com). It also offers a book finding service.

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## Geelong Branch News

Geelong Branch held an enjoyable Christmas dinner on 12 December. The first dinner meeting of the New Year will be held at the Geelong Club located at 74 Brougham Street in Geelong on Monday 20 February, commencing at 1830. The speaker is to be advised. The cost for the evening is \$ 35 per head, with drinks available at bar prices.

Bookings are required to be made - contact Mrs Margaret Barnes 03 5243 9569.



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