



ROYAL UNITED SERVICES INSTITUTE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA INC

NEWSLETTER

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DEFENCE UPDATE 2005

On 15 December 2005, the Government released its review of Australia's national security - Defence Update 2005. The report outlines the threats and challenges currently facing Australia, and the measures being taken to ensure our security. In this respect, the highest priorities are stated as:

- Defeating the threat of terrorism,
- Countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and
- Supporting regional states in difficulty.

The report concludes that the ADF needs to be able to confront current international security issues, such as terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan, whilst also helping to build capabilities in South East Asia. Meanwhile, the ADF will also need to maintain its capability to provide humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and offshore evacuation and peacekeeping—often at short notice and for sustained periods. New initiatives outlined in the report include:

- Considering options for a heavy airlift capability to supplement the medium airlift C130J aircraft. Op-

tions being considered are said to include the purchase or long-term lease of up to four US C-17 aircraft or eight Airbus Military A400M aircraft (currently under development).

- Increasing the size and capability of the Army through a ten year plan for a 'Hardened and Networked Army'. This will include increased fire support capability and flexibility as well as a new force structure based on combined arms battle groups. The strength of the army is to increase by up to 2500 over the next ten years.
- Re-rolling 3RAR to create a second mechanised battalion, to be based in Adelaide from 2011.

Along with increases and purchases already announced or underway, such as the re-furbished Abrams tanks, two new Amphibious heavy lift ships, the Air Warfare Destroyers, AEW&C aircraft and the new Joint Strike Fighter aircraft, Australia's capability to deploy and protect a meaningful force will be substantially improved over the next ten years.

PIRACY AND TERRORISM

As a trading nation, Australia has a strong vested interest in the security of the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) within the region and beyond. In particular, the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea area are critical to the economic well being of Australia and its major trading partners. Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and China are major importers of Middle East oil that passes along these SLOCs; as does

about 50% of the world's oil and 25% of the world's cargo. As an example of the importance of the Straits of Malacca, a typical voyage from the Gulf to Japan would be 1000nm longer through the Lombok-Makassar Straits as opposed to the Malacca-Singapore Straits route. This could add an estimated total of up to \$US250 Billion per year to shipping costs worldwide.

(Continued on page 3)

RUSI-SA COMING EVENTS

- ◆ Luncheon
6 March 2006
LTGEN Peter Leahy
Chief of Army
The Structure of the Australian Army
- ◆ Luncheon
3 April 2006
The Hon Alexander Downer,
Minister for Foreign Affairs
*Foreign Affairs Update
(to be confirmed)*
- ◆ BBQ on the Patio
Sunday 9 April 2006
Keswick Barracks
Officers Mess
1200 for 1300

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RUSI OF SA NOTICES

FROM 6 MARCH
OFFICE HOURS
WILL BE
1000-1600
MONDAY
AND
FRIDAY

Office Hours

The RUSI of SA office and library hours will change with effect 6 March 2006. The office and canteen will now open from 1000 to 1600 Monday and Friday. The library will also be open Monday and Friday from 1000 to 1600 and, volunteers allowing, on Wednesday (hours to be advised).

Luncheon Costs

Our caterer has advised of an increase in costs for the forthcoming year. Consequently, the price for the buffet lunch at our monthly events has been increased to \$20.00 per person. The increase is regretted, but unavoidable if we are to continue these events. To ease the pain a little, a ticket for the hamper raffle will be included.

RUSI of SA Secretary

The Secretary/Librarian, LCDR David Stryker, will complete his contract at the end of February. Interviews for a replacement are being held this month and we hope to have a new Secretary in place in early March.

SOCIAL PROGRAMME

BBQ

Sunday 9 April 2006

Following on from the success of last year's BBQ, it is planned to hold a similar event on the patio of the Keswick Barracks Officers Mess. Full details will be advised closer to the date.

Dining In Night

Friday 23 June 2006

Circumstances prevented us from having a Dining In Night last year, so the effort will be redoubled in 2006. To be held in the Officers Mess, we are hoping that our Patron will be able to attend.

Carvery

Sunday 20 August 2006

The annual Carvery at the Flagstaff Hill golf Club has been well attended and is a continuing success. A similar event is planned for 2006.



Piracy and Terrorism *(Continued from page 1)*

As a consequence, any threat to the efficient functioning of the accepted SLOCs, particularly the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, is of concern.

After 9/11, there was general acknowledgement that the worldwide shipping system could be vulnerable to disruption by terrorist attack. In the years since, violence on the high seas has become more prevalent, presenting a significant threat to the global trade system. But is this violence piracy or terrorism?

The key difference between piracy and maritime terrorism is the motivation of the perpetrators. Terrorists would seek to achieve political goals beyond the immediate act of attacking or hijacking a maritime target. They may seek to use the vessel to launch an attack or create an incident (such as blocking a narrow shipping channel or destroying maritime infrastructure) to try to achieve their political or social ends. On the other hand the goal of pirates is financial gain, usually from the theft of cargo and/or the ship itself or, increasingly often, holding the crew and ship for ransom. Death or injury to the crew may be incidental to the piracy objective whereas, in a terrorist attack, widespread death and destruction may well be the objective in itself.

Coincidentally, there is a common precondition or factor that gives rise to both piracy and terrorism – economic hardship. The economic circumstances on the littoral of the Straits of Malacca, for example, create an incentive for the lower socio-economic classes to turn to illegal sources of income, such as piracy. Economic hardship and inequality also foster resentment and can inspire radical movements to use terrorism to meet their objectives.

Pirates in the region range from fishermen who cannot catch enough fish to meet their needs to sophisticated organisations employing ex-military personnel with heavy weapons and high speed water craft. And the type and intensity of the piracy varies from one area to another. For example, in the Southern Straits of Malacca, the prevailing form is lightly armed locals in small fast vessels who attack a ship, usually violently, to steal whatever is available (often including the ship itself). In the north, on the other hand, the pirates tend to be better organised, use larger vessels (often hijacked previously) and heavy weapons. Their mode of operation is often to hold the crew and/or the ship to ransom. This has been surprisingly successful, mainly because they usually only demand a moderate amount of money, which ship owners are willing to pay to get their ship and crew back and in business.



Piracy attacks in the Straits of Malacca declined from 38 in 2004 to a total of 12 in 2005, according to the International Maritime Bureau. Some contributing factors to that decline may be the effect of the 2004 Tsunami (there were no reported attacks for at least two months after that disaster), the peace process and agreement in Aceh (Acehnese rebels were known to use piracy as a source of funding for their activities), and the perception of increased security patrols by the littoral states (through an increase in publicity, if not in fact).

Terrorist organisations such as al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah well understand the part that piracy could play in their terror campaigns. There has been increasing speculation, if not evidence, that these organisations and others wish to develop the capability to attack and hijack large ships and use them to attack ports and maritime infrastructure.

So what is a maritime terrorist attack, and what is the likelihood of occurrence? There have only been a few, and recent examples include the attack on the USS *Cole* in 2000, the attack on the French Tanker *Limberg* in 2002, and the *Superferry 14* bombing near Manila in 2004. The estimate of the risk of further attacks in the future is generally low. The previous attacks have not spawned a rash of copy-cat events and, indeed, the capability of regional terrorist groups to launch such attacks is still limited. The ability of a maritime terrorist attack to inflict major economic damage is difficult to predict; although Singapore is convinced that it could. Terrorist goals are usually for high impact, high visibility events, which might be difficult to achieve in the offshore environment. Similarly, the opportunity for large scale civilian casualties is limited; perhaps making maritime attacks unattractive to existing terrorist organisations.

That being said, it is a situation that could change quickly, and a capability that could be developed over a relatively short period of time. While the physical consequences may be limited in scale, the loss of confidence in the security of the SLOCs would have a far reaching effect throughout the region and beyond. The key to countering the threat, therefore, is five-fold:

- Good intelligence collection
- Effective maritime surveillance
- Effective physical security and response
- Effective and timely crisis management capability
- Regional and international cooperation

To return to the question of piracy and terrorism. There is no current indication that terrorists are teaming up with pirates, but there are fears that pirates may well be demonstrating to terrorists, if only indirectly, where opportunities might exist for them to pursue their aims in the maritime environment. As well as using maritime terrorism in this way, terrorists may resort to piracy or hijacking to finance their activities or to support the organisations with which they are affiliated. So it can probably best be summed up by saying: Pirates are not necessarily terrorists, but terrorists could be pirates.

Jeff McCulloch

OPERATIONS IN THE LAND OF THE TWO RIVERS

"PLAN, FIND, DESTROY AND PROTECT" WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY

By Major General A.J. Molan AO

OVERVIEW

From April 2004 to April 2005, I was assigned to the Headquarters of the Multinational Force Iraq, or MNF-I, as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations.

The MNF-I is the military side of a coalition of thirty like-minded nations dedicated to supporting the progress of Iraq to a democratic future under the authority of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546. I managed manoeuvre of combat forces, manoeuvre of Information and the conduct of Civil Military Operations, or as we say, "Current Operations". My actions were at all times governed by Australian Rules of Engagement and the Laws of Armed Conflict. While under the operational control of a US Commanding General, I was always under command of an Australian Commander.

The MNF-I is without doubt the largest, most modern, most potent force currently deployed on operations anywhere in the world. The core of MNF-I conducts 21st Century "near networked" warfare across the full spectrum of conventional and special operations, and its operations are integrated, as they should be, very much into the political, information and economic realms. The MNF-I operates every day in a politically charged and media scrutinized environment. In such a climate, the combat engagement is certainly more dramatic, but no more important, than the delivery of electricity and sewage systems to the people. And in this situation, the fair management of information has never been more critical.

War in Iraq is about the biggest issues that mankind can address. Amongst them are concepts of freedom, religion, the role of the individual in society, the place of nations in the world, and on a daily basis, life and death. Warfare in Iraq remains violent in the extreme, and close and sustained combat is the norm that must be expected and prepared for.

My deployment period covered an extraordinary time in the history of Iraq. When I arrived, I was part of an occupying force. When I left a transitional government was in place and was looking to write a constitution. In April 2004, the coalition had only one Iraqi battalion it could use in the first fight in Fallujah. By April 2005 there were 99 deployable combat battalions in the Iraqi Security Forces, about two-thirds with some form of combat experience. As we ran the war early on, we concentrated initially more on the purely kinetic approach to solving the insurgency (by kinetic I mean bullets and bombs). Despite the great soldiers that we had, we struggled in the initial battles in Najaf and Fallujah, more for strategic than tactical reasons. From April until about August of 2004 we experienced friction in coordinating the Military, Information, Eco-

nomie and Political lines of operation, had not yet seen the development of sufficient, competent ISF units, were humbled by Abu Ghraib, faced the possible withdrawal of members of the coalition, and were often on the back foot and finding it difficult to take the strategic initiative. But from August 2004 onward we hardly looked back.

We overcame much in the year I was in Iraq but what gave me most comfort was that there were indications that the people of Iraq were turning, if not always enthusiastically to the Coalition Force, but at least away from the terrorists. And those positive signs seem to be continuing. More of the Iraqi people, as measured by polls and anecdotally, were giving their grudging consent for the Coalition to operate in their country, at least for a time.

The price in lives and treasure for the progress that has been achieved in Iraq in the time of my deployment has been very high. I guess it is understandable that many Australians outside of the military whom I have spoken to since returning only have the most general idea how serious a fight this is. The war is reported to have cost the US approximately 1700 killed and \$242 billion so far, and the President had just signed a supplementary appropriation for another \$82 billion. This is by any measure a serious fight and from my observation on the spot, no one should underestimate the resolve of the US government or it's military.

The Iraq people have also suffered. Many hundreds of Iraqi people have been killed, maimed, orphaned or dispossessed through callous, sometimes indiscriminate and sometimes calculated terrorist actions. And let's not forget that the only group that the al Qa'ida affiliates like Zarqawi hate more than the US is the so called "apostate" Shi'ites.

But the Terrorists have also paid a high price. The extremist networks, particularly Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and other al Qa'ida affiliates, have been severely reduced but, as we have seen in April and May, are still capable of attacks against the ISF, and the most vulnerable parts of Iraqi society. But it is the Elections and the subsequent political process, providing a first step on the road to democracy for Iraq, and democracy and individual freedom that the terrorists fear most.

THE ENEMY

It is difficult to come up with a single term that describes our enemy in Iraq. The term "Enemy" is rarely used. The term "Insurgent" is often used but only covers one part of the enemy, and is still a debatable term. The Militias were a significant force and gained our attention for intense periods between April and August, but seem to be quiet now. The Jihadists are neither insurgents nor militias as much as they are downright Terrorists. Many of the kidnappers are not insurgents or Jihadists or militia members but plain criminals of the basest kind. But it is the indiscriminate use of terror that links almost all opposition groups in Iraq.

In considering what we might learn from Iraq, we need

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Operations in the Land of Two Rivers *(Continued from Page 4)*

to keep in the front of our minds that the enemy in this struggle are indeed evil. Attacks by the enemy in Iraq are indiscriminate, murderous, and intimidatory, with, of course, absolutely no accountability.

Now I am aware of the old saying that a terrorist is someone who has a bomb and does not have an air force. But for all the faults of the Coalition, I see no moral equivalency between the Coalition force in Iraq and our enemy. One only needs to read anything that Zargawi writes, and to look at the daily actions of all anti-Iraqi groups, to see that transgressions of the Laws of Armed Conflict are institutionalized within those groups in Iraq. Transgressions of the Laws of Armed Conflict, even merely allegations, are comparatively few on the Coalition side, and are neither condoned nor institutionalized.

Without understating its potency, the enemy that the Coalition faces in Iraq at the moment is a localized Sunni insurgency with Jihadist and criminal involvement, and with always the possibility of various Militias becoming active again. There is no indication that popular support for the insurgency has spread outside of the Sunni provinces, and there were indications that even Sunni support might be fracturing. I am satisfied that this is not a new Vietnam - the insurgency is not widely popular, nor is it widespread.

Rather than concentrate on the day to day headline grabbing violence, I found it of value in maintaining my own perspective over a tough year to ask myself: What did the enemy try to do but failed? In my time in Iraq, the enemy has demonstrably:

- failed to stop the Coalition Provisional Authority and the transfer of authority,
- failed to stop the Iraqi Interim Govt,
- failed to stop the Iraqi Transitional Govt,
- failed to kill the emerging Iraqi leadership,
- failed to stop the formation of the Iraqi Security Force,
- failed to stop the 30th January election,
- failed to maintain its safehavens, torture houses and chemical laboratories in Fallujah, and
- failed to stop initial improvements in the Iraqi economy through reconstruction.

Despite the tone of much popular commentary, this would seem to indicate that the Coalition and its Iraqi allies must have done something well in the last year.

THE STRATEGY

One of the factors that allowed us to be successful is that our campaign strategy was good to begin with, but developed and matured. The average insurgency in the 20th Century, I am told, lasted 9 years. Australia's last exposure to insurgency in Malaya and in Vietnam, despite their many differences, still offers us a few lessons.

The first is that national will remains critical. Most attacks, regardless of their immediate targets, are aimed

at the will of the Iraqi people, the resolve of the US, and the cohesion of the coalition. The second is that an insurgency is more amenable to political and economic measures than to military, and a counter insurgency campaign is sustained by information.

So the winning Strategy in Iraq emphasizes an approach across all lines of operation and remains a balance between the carrot and the stick. The stick is often the military while the carrot is normally political and economic.

This is a simple strategy. Like most simple strategies, its execution is not simple.

MY ROLE

As Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations I was responsible to the CG MNF-I for managing, under his authority and to achieve his intent, the operations that were conducted by the MNF-I and the Iraqi Security Force, including infrastructure operations, civil military operations and for a vital time, Strategic Communications.

Technically, I was to be responsible, as a senior member of the Commanding General's staff, for:

- the operations of all forces,
- implementing and executing assigned missions,
- directing, managing and controlling all activities,
- acting as staff and advisor to the CG.

Australia's contribution at the time, prior to the Muthanna deployment, was 300 to 400 troops on the ground supporting the rebuilding and rehabilitation of Iraq but not engaged on offensive operations in the manner of US troops. The "Three" shop managed the CG's manoeuvre of 150,000 to 300,000 Coalition and Iraqi troops - a somewhat larger force. And I found that while I was not leading the Australian contingent, my fellow generals in the headquarters were judging me as though I was the face of Australia's commitment to Iraq. My level of competence and commitment was being seen to represent Australia's level of competence and commitment - it was a daunting realisation. This is a critical fact and must be realised if we are to make the most of our limited human resources, and as we consider where we get the most bang for our very limited commitment buck. This of course is only one of the reasons that Australia must be able to generate high level warfighting competency, but it is a current reason. It was a great honour to be selected and for an Australian general to be given the responsibility that I was given. It says much for the way that the ADF is viewed in the world, and it says much for the lead partner in the Coalition, the US, that they incorporated a coalition officer into what is a critical position.

The operational environment in Iraq of recent times is patently the most stringent test of command and senior staff competence to be experienced anywhere.

LESSONS FOR THE ADF

So what does it all mean for the ADF? There is a plethora of lessons for the ADF in this fight but I will try to cover only two: the nature of this 21st Century war and Generalship and its mastery.

(Continued on page 6)

Operations in the Land of Two Rivers *(Continued from Page 5)*

The Nature of Modern Warfare

There is an extraordinary amount about modern warfare that we can learn from what is happening in Iraq. I would not fall into the trap of saying that we should prepare only for the kind of conflict that is happening in Iraq. But the kind of sustained combined arms combat operations, supported by joint forces, that is the everyday fare in Iraq must be understood in detail by our military. If religious extremism reaches our region in a much more aggressive form, or if our commitment to the Global War on Terror continues, then terrorist tactics and techniques are likely to come from Iraq and Afghanistan, not from Malaya and Vietnam. We must learn from US combat units (not just special forces) who are conducting sustained joint combat operations, and in particular we must learn from the US Reserve and National Guard experience. Just as importantly, we must study how the US commands on the battlefield.

What is warfare in Iraq? It is violent, it is coalition, it is asymmetric and it is urban. It is combined arms land operations with joint forces. I ran the day to day aspects of this war with probably the most networked forces in the world, yet rarely did I hear the terms "networked" or "net-enabled". We were doing it, not talking about it. 21st Century warfare is highly technical but has not lessened the amount of close combat for the warrior. Warrior skills are required in every part of the force not just combat units. Every convoy is a fighting patrol. Force protection of our soldiers and rear area security is now of overwhelming importance, and each takes skill and manpower. This means that to deploy a single, self sustaining brigade of perhaps 3000 troops, as we have traditionally considered in the past, into a post-Iraq combat environment, the total number of troops deployed is likely to be closer to six to ten thousand than to our traditional idea of a light brigade of 3000. The nature of war has changed as has our society's expectations, and they continue to change, and we must understand the impacts on us.

Information is critical to everything that we did and that we will have to do. We had great problems just breaking even in the information war for a variety of reasons, but we did extraordinarily well because of the way we integrated information into the operations process.

The role of the UAV and Full Motion Video is central to the nature of operations in Iraq. We lived and breathed ISR and in particular Full Motion Video, upon which life and death decisions were daily based. In this fight, even at the strategic level, there were tactical level units and rear area security units either answering directly to our staff or being managed on behalf of the Commanding General. Full Motion Video allows great flexibility in the use of scarce resources such as Special Forces or Quick Reaction Forces, and facilitates demonstrable compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict.

'Generalship' - the competence necessary of senior mili-

tary officers, often receives scant public attention, but it is Army, Navy and Air Force Generalship that will give Australia the real edge as similar technologies spread throughout our Region, and international conflict is based on asymmetry.

Generalship

How do we ensure that we equip our most senior officers with the necessary warfighting skills for this or any other type of war? The ADF has not conducted sustained (over years) combat operations, or their equivalents on the sea or in the air, since Vietnam, and the campaigns that we have conducted since Vietnam have indeed been difficult and demanding, but they have not involved sustained close combat, and very little fighting in joint teams outside some Special Forces elements. Given the small size of our military, we have a continuing need for Generals who know operational generalship at an international standard, particularly in Joint operations. My view is that we must get "back to basics" for warfighting, operational generalship in the ADF. In the same sense that we set standards for fighter pilots and for ships captains, we should be doing something like that for Australia's most senior commanders.

CONCLUSION

So the base line conclusion that I draw from a year at the centre of the war in Iraq is that this form of warfare should not be considered to be the so-called "last war" whose lessons we should be skeptical about learning. The element of the Iraq war that we should be looking at, and testing ourselves against, is the sustained close combat being conducted as part of combined arms operations, supported by joint forces, and of course Generalship, with all its military and political connotations. Of course, it should not be the only war we study. But if this kind of war ever comes to a theatre near Australia, or we decide to make a robust and offensive contribution to some aspect of the global War on Terror, then we will need to be very good at these types of operations, from the Generals all the way down to the soldiers.

I make these comments because in my 12 months in Iraq, I planned a multitude of operations, military and non-military. I focused most of the elements of power across all the lines of operations to defeat the insurgency, complementing the military, and culminating at the elections. On behalf of Gen Casey, the operations team found and dealt with terrorists cells and terrorist leaders who would not accept that freedom and democracy were the future for Iraq, and Jihadists who offered the modern Iraqi nothing.

I learnt much about the Land of the Two Rivers, the cradle of civilization, and how civilization was being threatened there. I was reminded once again, as I had personally seen in PNG, Indonesia, East Timor and the Solomons over the last 30 years, that there is still truth in the hackneyed saying that freedom is not free, but must be purchased and re-purchased with blood and sacrifice. I also witnessed sacrifice and courage, dedica-

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Operations in the Land of Two Rivers (Continued from Page 6)

tion and professionalism, cruelty and barbarism, often in the same day or even the same hour

I am positive about the situation in Iraq. The war in Iraq is winnable. I did not do what the terrorists want and allow myself to be distracted by the cruel and inhuman day to day slaughter of innocent Iraqis by terrorists. Instead I fought to protect the Iraqis. None of us ever thought that it would be an easy task and there is no such thing as a guarantee of success. There is a long road ahead for Iraq and for the supporters of the Iraqi people, but the journey must now be led by the Iraqis themselves, and they are becoming more capable of doing this each day. The future of Iraq, and perhaps much more, now depends on the ongoing battle of wills, and on our resolution in implementing the good strategy that we have.

Major General Jim Molan gave a presentation to the RUSI of SA, based on this paper, on 5 December 2005. This edited version of his original paper is published with his kind permission.



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The views expressed in this Newsletter are not necessarily those of the RUSI of SA

AUSTRALIA'S FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICY IN PNG AND THE SOUTH PACIFIC

By Lieutenant Colonel Mike Dennis, MBE (Retd)

Australia's near neighbours form a geographical half circle from PNG in the North to New Zealand in the South East. Disregarding New Zealand, it is often referred to as a ring of instability.

PNG suffers from law and order problems, corruption and nepotism, and an increase in Asian business practices. The Solomon Islands is just back from the brink as a failed state. Nauru is a failed state! Vanuatu is still suffering from its Francophile divisions and political instability. Kiribati and Tuvalu are drowning under global warming problems. Fiji contends with continual political and military instability following successive coups. Tonga has internal pressures as a feudal kingdom versus a modern society, and concerns regarding the succession when the current king dies. Western Samoa struggles for financial self sufficiency and political stability.

All these countries are subject to increasing numbers of immigrants with links to crime organisations, identity scams and drug growing, manufacture and smuggling. Weapons and people smuggling are increasing and the potential for terrorists to transit and use lax immigration procedures to gain entry into Australia is great.

For the last twenty years, Australian political figures of both persuasions have shown little interest in the South Pacific area. They do not understand the cultural differences in the region and, in general, the South Pacific does not generate votes or interest domestically.

Australia's relationship with PNG, the former Australian colony granted independence in 1975, has deteriorated over time. A key issue has been the methods which Australia, quite rightly, has attempted to implement to ensure that the A\$300M aid it grants annually is spent responsibly. A growing sense of nationalism and independence has seen PNG leaders resent this approach - highlighted by the recent failure of the law and order support package. Although the package was full of merit, those who were to approve the package were most likely to be the target in the clean up, leading to a coordinated resistance.

Within the military there has been a long simmering resentment that most of the Defence Cooperation budgets were spent on Australian administration and the PNGDF did not have primacy on where money was to be spent or how Australian Defence Force personnel should be used within PNG. This has led to a reduction of ADF personnel in PNG from 103 in 1990 to 18 in 2006. Also, a lack of personal experience and rapport in Australian Foreign Affairs and Defence has diminished the close relationship that existed post independence.

The Australian led deployment to the Solomon Islands in 2004 rescued the people of the Solomon Islands from

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Australia's Foreign and Defence Policy in PNG and the South Pacific *(Continued from Page 7)*

the brink of a failed state. The decline of the Solomon Islands had been obvious for many years and is probably a good case study for the pattern of development for many Pacific Island countries in the future. The current success of the intervention is refreshing in terms of Australia's role in the South Pacific; I only hope that the resolve is evident to continue this project for another ten years or so, to give the Solomon Islands a real chance of success.

The politics of Fiji are more complex, following a series of coups commencing in 1987. The popular political and media opinion in Australia is that racial differences between Indians and Fijians are the root cause of this instability. This is incorrect. The political and military instability is caused by a power play between moderate and radical nationalist Fijians. This power play, generally along traditional tribal boundaries, has divided the RFMF as shown by the attempt on the Commander's life in 2000 by Special Force soldiers loyal to the nationalists. The current tensions in Fiji are based on the allegations by the Commander RFMF that the current government is not pursuing and punishing those responsible for the uprisings in 2000, as they have strong links to members of the government. Australia needs to take a moderate course of action and comment to avoid impeding a role as a potential peace broker in the future.

In summary I believe Australia has failed in its foreign and defence policy in PNG and the South Pacific despite the success of the Solomon Islands intervention and the Pacific Patrol Boat Program, which is undoubtedly the most successful aid program in the region. Australia does not have the influence and rapport it should have for its financial investment, primarily because of poor personal relationships and a lack of understanding of the cultural idiosyncrasies within the region. This can only be improved by a major review and by changes in attitudes by politicians and senior bureaucrats towards Australia's prime foreign and defence priorities.

Lieutenant Colonel Dennis was the Senior Desk Officer PNG and South West Pacific in the Defence Intelligence Organisation 1986-1988 and 1991. He also served as a Defence Advisor in PNG 1988-1990 and as the Defence Attaché South Pacific 1991-1994. This article is his personal opinion.

Electronic Newsletter

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or at RUSI Office, Keswick Barracks.

DSTO NEWS

A new Centre of Expertise established by the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) is expected to boost the nation's capability in phased array and microwave radar systems, a niche technology with strategic importance to Australia's defence.

DSTO and the University of Adelaide signed an agreement to establish the centre within the University's School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering. It will be known as the Centre of Expertise in Phased Array and Microwave Radar Systems (CEPAMR). Chief Defence Scientist, Dr Roger Lough, said the Centre of Expertise concept was DSTO's strategic engagement initiative with Australia's science and technology community. "This will be a unique national capability at the forefront of advanced radar, telecommunications, navigation and electronic warfare applications," Dr. Lough said. "It is about building a niche capability to support Defence and national security." The agreement establishing the new centre was signed by DSTO's Deputy Chief Defence Scientist (Systems), Dr (D.) Nanda Nandagopal, and the University's Deputy Vice Chancellor (Research), Prof. Neville Marsh. Dr Nandagopal said the centre would develop excellence in research and teaching in phased array and microwave radar systems. "The new centre will underpin efforts by DSTO and Australian industry to tackle practical engineering problems associated with the design, development and integration of the next generation phased array systems," he said.

LIBRARY NEWS

The RUSI of SA library catalogue is now available to all library users and researchers on a stand-alone computer (kindly donated by Logi-tech Pty Ltd). The Bookmark search programme is easy and intuitive, and very effective. The RUSI of WA and RUSI of QLD library catalogues will also be available on this system.

We are seeking volunteers to be trained on the Bookmark catalogue system and to help out in the library on an occasional basis. With the new office hours to be implemented in March, the library can only be opened on Wednesday if there are sufficient volunteers to help out. If you are interested, or you know of someone who may be interested, please advise our Secretary-Librarian.

A number of books have been added to the collection in the last two months, so call in and have a look next time you are near Keswick Barracks.

THE RUSI OF SA
LIBRARY
MAINTAINS AN
EXTENSIVE
COLLECTION OF
FICTION AND
NON-FICTION
BOOKS

OPEN
MON, WED, FRI
1000-1600

RECOMMENDED READING

America's Secret War

George Friedman (Little, Brown 2004)

The author is the founder and chairman of *Stratfor*, a leading private intelligence company in the USA. Friedman is also the author of four books and numerous articles on international security, warfare and intelligence. In *America's Secret War* he delves into the presidential strategies of the last 25 years. Friedman identifies the United States' most dangerous enemies and looks at the reasons behind the attack on the World Trade Centre. He also analyses the Bush administration's motivation for the war in Iraq.

Out of Evil

New International Politics and Old Doctrines of War
Stephen Chan (I.B.Taurus 2005)

Stephen Chan is Professor of International Relations and Dean of Law and Social Sciences at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. In this book, he analyses the idea of evil in international relations, its historical origins and its moral, legal and political foundations. He asks the question: is the fight against evil merely a new form of imperialism?

DSTO NEWS (CONTINUED FROM PAGE 8)

Research outputs from the centre are expected to have significant long term benefits for defence applications such as:

- capability development of the phased array radar on airborne platforms as well as radars proposed for future naval platforms,
- emerging Ballistic Missile Defence surveillance and tracking requirements, and
- a potential indigenous air defence radar system for Army applications.

DSTO scientist, Dr Bevan Bates, will be seconded to the University as Director of the new centre. This is the second Centre of Expertise between DSTO and the University. The two organisations already collaborate under a Centre of Expertise in Photonics. It is expected that the new centre will support growing national requirements for radio frequency engineers within DSTO, industry and the civilian commercial sector.

The Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) is part of Australia's Department of Defence. DSTO's role is to ensure the expert, impartial and innovative application of science and technology to the defence of Australia and its national interests.

MONTHLY LUNCHEONS

All members are invited to attend our luncheons. Indeed, you are encouraged to invite partners, friends and colleagues to join us and, if they like what they see, to nominate them for membership. Please book in advance. The dress for the luncheon is neat casual, taking into consideration weather conditions.

We assemble in Building 34A, Keswick Barracks, Keswick, at approximately 11.30am for drinks and good fellowship. Members are asked to be seated by 12 noon when our President welcomes members and guests, and lunch is served.

The cost of the buffet is \$20.00. Special dietary requirements can be met, but these must be ordered by

Midday on the Thursday before the lunch.

For those who do not have time to enjoy lunch, but wish to hear the lecture, chairs are provided around the perimeter of the hall. Please be seated before 12.55pm, as the guest speaker will be introduced at 1.00pm. The address is of about 30 to 35 minutes duration with 15 minutes for questions, after which coffee or tea is available.

We aim to complete the program by 2.00pm.

Cancellations must be advised to the RUSI Office by midday of the Friday before the lunch. Subsequent cancellations will attract a fee of \$20.00.



**ROYAL UNITED SERVICES INSTITUTE
OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA INC**

A CONSTITUENT BODY OF THE ROYAL UNITED INSTITUTE OF
AUSTRALIA INC

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Office Hours

Wednesday to Friday

10:00am to 4:00pm

From 6 March 2006

Monday and Friday

10:00am to 4:00pm

**PROMOTING NATIONAL SECURITY
AND DEFENCE**

RUSI of SA

The Royal United Service Institute of South Australia (RUSI of SA) was founded more than 100 years ago and is related to constituent bodies in every capital city in Australia. The aim of the RUSI of SA is to encourage the discussion of national security and defence matters, and to improve public awareness and understanding of such matters.

The Institute is an independent, not-for-profit organisation. It is not affiliated with, or sponsored by the Department of Defence or any other government department. However, because RUSI objectives and activities are relevant to the defence of Australia, the Department of Defence does provide some financial support and facilities.

The Institute is managed by an elected President and Council. All positions are honorary.

Her Excellency Marjorie Jackson-Nelson, AC, CVO, MBE, Governor of South Australia is Patron.

The RUSI of SA office is in Building 160 at Keswick Barracks, Keswick. The facilities also include a comprehensive library, comfortable reading room and members' canteen. Members and visitors are encouraged to use the facilities for reading and research.

Membership is open to anyone with an interest in defence and security issues, irrespective of armed forces or civilian background or rank. The Annual Subscription Fee, 1st July to 30th June, is \$33.00. Membership is transferable between constituent bodies at no cost until subscription renewal falls due.

The RUSI of SA Newsletter is published bi-monthly and contains transcripts of recent presentations, articles of interest on current defence and security issues, notices of coming events and library news and book reviews.

A DIGRESSION ON THE TOPIC OF DIRTY BOMBS BY DR COLIN KEAY

A so-called dirty bomb is created when radioactive substances are incorporated in a bomb relying on conventional chemical explosives for its blast. In 2002, responding to scaremongering on the subject, Dr A C McEwan, President of the Australasian Radiation Protection Society, issued a press release indicating that while a realistic dirty bomb would cause damage and loss of life, its radiological effects would be minor.

The radioactive material for a dirty bomb would most likely be obtained through the theft of a medical or industrial radiation source using iridium-192 or caesium-137. These isotopes would need to be removed from their lead shielding and wrapped with explosive, during which time the bomb-maker would receive a substantial, but probably not lethal, radiation dose. Detonation of such a device would spread the radioactive material as dust in the air and on exposed surfaces. However the health impacts of the airborne dust would be minor, giving people in the vicinity of the blast doses similar to those incurred in medical procedures such as CT scans. The dose from radioactive dust settled on surfaces would be negligible.

If a greater quantity of caesium-137 was used, from a

stolen cancer therapy source for example, the hazard to the bomb-maker would be much more serious, probably fatal. But if a terrorist did succeed in delivering and detonating such a device the radioactive dust would still not be immediately hazardous to life for victims caught in the target building or for rescuers entering the area. The biggest threat, from a realistic dirty bomb, would result from uncontrolled panic, which could be minimized if the foregoing expert assessment was made widely known.

*Dr Keay advises that the above material is a condensed version of a more thorough analysis by Dr McEwan in his book *Nuclear New Zealand—Sorting Fact from Fiction*, published by Hazard Press, Christchurch 2004.*

*The views expressed in this
Newsletter are not necessarily
those of the RUSI of SA*