



RUSI WA NEWSLETTER

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RUSI WA Latest Events Update

RUSI WA has promoted the following events and lectures since our last issue:

August 2014 - Mr Serge DeSilva, Non-resident Fellow from the National Security Institute, University of Canberra, presented a lecture entitled 'Axis and Allies: WWII in the Indian Ocean region';

October 2014 - Dr Alexey Muraviev, the Head of the Department of Social Sciences and International Relations at Curtin University, Perth, Western Australia. He is also a Coordinator of the International Relations and National Security postgraduate programs and the founder and director of the Strategic Flashlight forum on national security and strategy at Curtin University. He delivered a most brilliant lecture on 'Operation in the Middle East 2014: Another COIN of a New Gulf War?';

November 2014 – Mr Graham Bentley AM, Director of International Business Development Lockheed Martin Australia, delivered a lecture on 'Joint Strike Fighter Project';

December 2014- Christmas function at the Cheeky Sparrow in the very heart of Perth CBD. It was a very successful event where several RUSI WA members could socialise and celebrate the end of another year;

February 2015- First 2015 lecture presented by MS Sarah Perry, Senior Cyber Security Consultant Thales Australia, on the very current issue of 'People Not Packets – Cyber Security as an Intelligence Problem'.

RUSI WA Upcoming Lecture - Reminder

This Thursday 26th March at 7.30 pm Mr. Steve Lieblich will be delivering a lecture in our Fremantle headquarters entitled 'THE MIDDLE EAST IN FLAMES. Mr Lieblich, son of Holocaust survivors, was born in Jaffa, Israel, and migrated to Western Australia during the 1950's. He will be giving a brief overview or 'tour d'horizon' on events that have recently been taking place in the Middle East, such as the shifting in political alliances and strategic posture, as well as the challenges faced by Israel in the region. We look forward to seeing many RUSI WA members and guests there.
(\$5 entry includes supper)

Our Next RUSI WA lecture

Our next RUSI WA lecture will be on Thursday 23rd April at 7.30 pm and our key note guest speaker is still to be confirmed. We will keep all RUSI WA members posted.

Dear RUSI WA members,

It is with great pleasure and honour that I have taken the job as the new newsletter editor. Our informative magazine will be released from now on as a monthly issue.

I would strongly encourage all members to forward opinion pieces, academic articles or book reviews so that we can instigate greater debate around matters of defence and national security both in Western Australia and in the country. It would be fantastic if we could make our newsletter as democratic as possible. Your contributions to the magazine will be highly valued and fundamental to have an overview of defence issues in a wide range of perspectives.

Western Australia is geographically the most strategic state in the Australian Commonwealth due to its proximity to nations in the Asia and Indo –Pacific. Your input to geopolitical/strategic issues in Western Australia and in Australia would be also much appreciated.

Finally, we all thank very much and appreciate the work done by former RUSI Vice-President and newsletter editor Robert Mitchell. Robert's contribution to RUSI WA Branch and to the defence debate in Western Australia was significant one and we all appreciate his years of dedication and hard work.


I hope you all enjoy our latest issue!

With kind regards,

Flavia Bellieni Zimmermann

Editor

Editorial



The Australian submarine project (Sea 1000) and the Collins-class replacement

One issue that has dominated the Australian defence circles debate particularly in the last couple of months is the Collins –class submarine replacement project. This project has been singled out by many experts as one of the most ambitious and expensive projects ever implemented in Australian Defence history.

Plans to replace the Collins-class submarines were initially discussed back in 2007 and only more recently the Department of Defence became more vocal on the necessity of a more comprehensive and efficient submarine fleet in the country.

During the Kevin Rudd federal administration, a ‘grand plan’ to introduce to the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) fleet at least 12 new submarines emerged. The initial plan was to design and build conventional submarines that would be then equipped with nuclear capabilities. Some claim that nuclear submarines, for having a high power and speed capacity, would be the more suitable for Australia’s vast naval coastline and to patrol regions across the Indian Ocean.

However, the cost and risk involved end up sealing the fate of this first project.

Six years down the track and many hundred millions of dollars spent from our defence budget, and the future of Australian submarine fleets is still uncertain.

It is valid to state that Collins-class submarines are scheduled to begin leaving service by 2025, which makes a pressing political issue to think through the issue and raise questions whether they should be upgraded or new technology be introduced.

Experts propose that four design options would be available: to introduce a Military-Off-The-Shelf (MOTS) design; to modify a MOTS layout for the Australian defence needs and geographical landscape; upgrade and 'evolve' the Collins-class submarines or simply start a new submarine line creating a new cutting edge and innovative design.

Collins-class submarine market availability has been reduced. Besides, according to Rex Patrick, their maintenance and operational system would cost annually around \$800 million dollars to Australian tax payers. The Collins class submarines also would have other disadvantages. Australia's vast coastline and unique operating environment require submarines designed to long distance missions, which is not a feature of such submarines. This may be one of the reasons behind the 2009 Australian Defence White Paper to double Australian submarine fleet to 12 boats by 2030-2040 and to discontinue the Collins class from our defence system.

Last year the federal government started once again talks for an Australian submarine project and the future of the RAN submarine capabilities. To discuss such project, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) hosted a conference entitled 'The Submarine Choice'. During three days this prestigious symposium discussed the difficulties faced by Australia while considering its future submarine alternatives. One aspect that has dominated this forum is that our future submarine fleets should be superior to the other Indo-Pacific nations, but at the same time, be cost effective and affordable. The challenge is exactly how we can accommodate the need for a greater naval presence in the region and still carry out a project that has realistic budgetary expectations.

Thus, another problem to be taken into account is the new security environment and challenges posed in the region by international terrorism. With the decline in North American power in the world stage and a rising China, it is crucial to Australia to develop its own defence identity in the region. For this to take place, the country will need to increase its submarine fleet and ensure that its naval coastline is kept safe. This would demonstrate Australia's neighbouring Asian nations that it takes border protection and national security issues seriously. This being so, it is necessary that Australia invest in more advanced technology and innovation for our submarine capabilities.

It is believed that Australia is the only navy in the world to engage its diesel submarines thousands of kilometres across the ocean to patrol the region. It is valid to mention that leading conventional submarine designers such as Germany and the Sweden utilise their submarines for short range missions only. The next generation of Australian submarines must be faster than the Collins class and, preferable, easily adjusted from conventional to a nuclear capacity if needed in the near future. This being so, it is fundamental that the federal government equip the RAN with quality and efficient submarines, thus, determining the geopolitical impact and identity of Australia in the Indo-Pacific.

The Australian Commonwealth currently has the option to either build its new submarine fleet in Adelaide or in an offshore capacity. Costs and the logistics involved are issues that must be taken into consideration. Australia would have as possible options the following submarine technologies: Japanese, Germans, Swedish or French. Each submarine technology has its own weaknesses and strengths. However, it is important for Australia to consider which of the technologies available would suit best its geographic and geostrategic interests in the region.

Swedish technology may be regarded by some as outdated. But the fact that the country has not designed a new submarine class in the last few years should not undermine their current capability to successfully build a new class for the Australian project. As stated by Kym Bergmann, their technology continues being up to date since the Saab still carries out the maintenance and service of submarines in Sweden, Singapore and even Australia.

The latest German technology comes, as a matter of fact, from Sweden. The Kockums, regarded as national Swedish champions, have been sold to German companies back in 2000. Only last year their ownership returned to Swedish hands, but the knowledge and access to its mode of operation will most certainly continue to be used in the development of the German industry.

On their turn, French submarines could also be seen as an option for our future submarine design. According to Foreign Affairs Minister Julie Bishop, French submarine technology could be an option for future Australian submarine fleets because they could offer the RAN a rather simple transition from a conventional submarine to a nuclear propulsion one.

The Japanese Soryu-class or improved Oyashio class, is the most recent line of conventional submarines and is equipped to deliver enhanced operational capabilities and endurance. Colonel Mick Ryan understands that this class of submarines could be suitable for Australian defence needs. Nevertheless, a problem that cannot be discarded is the issue associated with WWII POW and social resentment that a Japanese built submarine could bring about in the Australian society.

In a recent interview to the ABC News, The Minister of Defence Kevin Andrews explained that the Defence Department would 'seek proposals from potential partners looking at options to either design and build overseas, in Australia or a hybrid approach through a competitive evaluation process'. Andrews continued this interview mentioning that the Australian submarine project should create around 500 new jobs in South Australia. Yet, it is still left in the open if the submarines will be fully built and designed in the country.

South Australian Premier Jay Weatherill recently stated to the ABC News that he believes the federal government is inclined to trust the Japanese with the job. He also demonstrated disappointment that, regardless of still having competitive submarine technology, the Swedish have been ruled as not fitting the competitiveness requirement. Defence expert

Chris Burns also demonstrated surprise and disappointment that the Swedish have already been eliminated from the process. Thus, the final quest to build the first Australian submarine will be between the Japanese, French and Germans.

Finally, Rex Patrick states that for a successful Australian submarine project the Australian Commonwealth should keep the following principles as guidelines:

‘Step one: Politics must be removed from the procurement equation;

Step two: Defence must outline its submarine needs in a manner that avoids an unaffordable gold plated solution; differentiating between essential, important and desirable requirements such that objective cost capability trade off analysis can be performed during the third and final step.

Step three: Run a competition between the western alliance submarine houses of pedigree to tease out 1) the details of each candidates’ submarine, 2) the package that comes with it (including Australian Industry involvement), 3) any associated restrictions and 4) the price.

With step three in mind the Australian authorities will need to assess what France, Germany and Japan will have to offer. It is fundamental that the federal government keep an open minded approach to the Australian submarine project and scrutinise the risks and benefits offered by each country’ technology before taking a final decision. These are only some thoughts that demand reflection and that should tease out and promote greater interest and discussion in such a polarising and controversial topic.

The Editor

Letters to the Editor are more than welcome and will be published in our next issue.

ANNOUNCEMENTS



I would like to call all members' attention to the upcoming Sub Summit Conference in Adelaide on 24, 25 e 26 March 2015. Most issues raised in this newsletter's editorial will be debated to a great extend in this forum. This conference is a partnership between The Royal United Services Institute Adelaide Branch, SAGE International and Hargraves Institute. It will be a vital forum of discussion for the future directions of the Australian defence capabilities and naval fleet.

This forum aims at discussing the public perception of the Collins class submarine capabilities and, on more realistic terms, the impact that an Australian built and designed submarines will have on sea patrol and defence needs of our nation.

During the discussion panels, experts in the field with discuss the current needs of the Australian Royal Navy, the myths perpetrated by the media and clarify the most suitable options available. It important to consider that future Australian submarines should be both cost effective and adequate to our landscape and peculiarities of our defence demands.

Public information and education will be the main focus of the debate and discussion panels throughout the Sub Summit in Adelaide.

It would be an immense pleasure seeing some Royal United Services Institute Western Australia Branch members attending the forum and having a say towards our nation's defence strategic future.

For further information please access the Sub Summit website

<http://subsummit.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/ss-hero-03.jpg>

'Rarely is the timing so right to be an influential player in Australia's biggest ever defence program. Please help us make this event significant and so relevant to the decision makers and to our future submariners. Be a partner, be involved, be there!'

MARK RYAN MBA, WING COMMANDER (RET'D),

JOURNAL ARTICLE**Geopolitical considerations on the development of a nation's national strategy:
Mackinder's heartland theory and strategic planning in the twentieth century**By Flavia Bellieni Zimmermann¹**Introduction**

The conduct of war and its operations are overwhelmingly influenced by the geographical landscape of a country. It is valid to state that all military branches of a nation are significantly impacted by the physical environment when planning a military campaign, strategy and tactics. Nevertheless, it would be the military branch that is the most influenced by the constraints imposed by nature². The geography of a nation, sea access routes, entrance and exit routes from neighbouring nations, are determining factors on the political power plays between countries and their respective regions³. Geography will determine the most vulnerable flanks of a country's border and the development and level of military expertise of such nation. If the country happens to be an island, it will most certainly invest considerable amount of its national revenue its naval forces for maritime protection of their coastal borders⁴.

Another determining factor for countrys' military strategy would be its history and political interests in the region. A country with vast territory, which has been consistently inflicted by threats of invasion from neighbouring regions, would most certainly be a highly militarized nation. History, combined with geographical considerations, would produce an impact in the people's collective memory and on the development of a particular strategic culture and worldview. Mackinder's heartland theory is fundamental to understand the issue of balance

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² John Baylis, James J. Wirtz and Colin Gray (ed.) *Strategy in the Contemporary World: An introduction to Strategic Studies* (UK/ Oxford: Oxford University Press, YEAR), p.125.

³ Ewan W. Anderson, *Geopolitics: International Fighting Bondaries as Fighting Places*, in Colin Gray and Geoffrey Sloan (ed), *Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy Strategy* (UK/ London: Published by Frank Cass), p.7.

⁴ Michael S. Lindberg, *Geographical Impact on Coastal Defence Navies*, (NY/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), p.3.

of power in Europe. The issue of geopolitics and strategic culture became politically prominent, particularly after the Second World War and the Cold War period, with the issue of balance of power between the two superpowers.⁵ Thus, the geographical location of a country will be a decisive factor for the balance of power in the region, influencing the decision making process, policy making and the development of a national strategic plan. This article endeavours to explain the importance of the geopolitical considerations in the development of a country's national strategy.

Geopolitical considerations would focus primarily on the geography of the land aiming at enhancing political discussions, particularly during the decision making process⁶. The world of today is a globalized one; nevertheless, organized sovereign states continue to be of great relevance for international politics across the globe⁷. The state is a political and juridical entity endowed with sovereignty over a determinate geographical area, the adjacent ocean, population and its natural resources. Thus, geopolitics would be an attempt to captivate ones attention to the relevance of geography on the political arena and the international scenario⁸. Geopolitics also emphasises that political strength is a matter not merely restricted to human or natural resources, but an issue of how the geographical terrain could be used to empower strategy and tactics⁹. Thus, it would be accurate to state that 'power is local'¹⁰. This being so, when an international conflict arises, the distance and space between the countries in dispute have been of great significance for the development of a national strategic plan.

It is of vital importance, therefore, to establish a correlation between geopolitics, geography and strategy. Nevertheless, the landscape and geographical disposition of a nation should not be regarded merely as a 'straight jacket'¹¹. The founder of modern geopolitical theory, Sir Halford Mackinder (1861-1947) understood that geography and the disposition of the terrain

⁵ Alastair Iain Johnston, Thinking about Strategic Culture. *International Security*, (4)19, Spring 1995, pp32-64.

⁶ Ewan W. Anderson, Geopolitics: International Boundaries as Fighting Places in Colin Gray and Geoffrey Sloan (ed.), *Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy* (UK/ London: Published by Frank Cass,), p.7

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Colin S. Gray and Geoffrey Sloan, *Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy* (NY/New York: Routledge, 1999), p2.

⁹ H. and M. Sprout, Geography and International Relations in an Era of Revolutionary Change', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (1)6, March 1960.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Colin S. Gray and Geoffrey Sloan, *Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy* (NY/New York: Routledge, 1999), p2.

should be seen as opportunities that to be exploited by policymakers and politicians¹². The most important legacy of Mackinder for strategic thought, however, would be the heartland theory¹³. Mackinder's heartland concept explained that the Euro-Asia region would become an area of contested borders, being the strategic pivot in the fight for world domination and spheres of influence throughout the twentieth century¹⁴. In particular after The First World War period and with the advent of the Ribbentrop Molotov non- aggression pact between the German Furher Adolf Hitler and the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin¹⁵, Mackinder's heartland concept gained a prophetic tone¹⁶.

It is possible to analyse geography in Mackinder's heartland theory and its impact on a nation's strategic measures though three different angles. Firstly, it could be seen as the 'bedrock of international politics, a board of a chess game'¹⁷. Secondly, the geographical landscape could be seen as the environment where the military operations will take place. This view must take into consideration not only the terrain but also biology, collective psychology and sociology of the land¹⁸. Finally, it could be analysed as a theatre of military operations¹⁹. The theatre of operations approach to geography could be traced to ancient China and the writings of Sun Tzu in 'The Art of War'²⁰. In his work, Sun Tzu elucidates that the landscape can be used by the military commander as a strategic advantage; it also assists with battle field objectives and tactics.²¹ Geography thus plays a major role in the choices made by political players, on a country's strategic plan, and also by the use of force to be applied by the military commander.

¹² H.J. Mackinder, The Physical Basis of Political Geography, Scottish Geographical Magazine 6(1890), p.84.

¹³ Brian W. Blouet (ed.) Global Geostrategy: Mackinder and the Defense of the West (NY/New York: Taylor and Francis, 2013), p.12.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ John Monsier, Hitler versus Stalin: The Eastern Front 1941-1945 (NY/New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010), p72.

¹⁶ Stalin and Hitler sealed the Ribbentrop Molotov Pact wishing to restore their countries prewar borders and increase their power in the region. It would also divide central Europe into two spheres of influence, aiming at securing world dominance to the Germans and Russians. *in* John Monsier, Hittler versus Stalin: The Eastern Front 1941-1945 (NY/New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010), p.74.

¹⁷ Geoffrey Sloan, Sir Harold J. Mackinder: The Heartland Theory Then and Now, *in* Colin S. Gray and Geoffrey Sloan, Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy (NY/New York: Routledge, 1999), p.10.

¹⁸ T.Stoinovich, The French Historical Method: The Annates (Ithaca NY: Cornell UP 1976), p8.

¹⁹ Robin A. Butlin, The Pivot and Imperial Defense Policy, *in* Brian W. Blouet (ed.) Global Geostrategy: Mackinder and the Defense of the West (NY/New York: Taylor and Francis, 2013), p.35.

²⁰ Sun Tzu, The Art of War, note 7 (UK/London: Arcturus, 2010).

²¹ Ibid, note 9.

This being so, the geographical factors would be highly influential on the composition of the military branches of a nation. The armed forces, for instance, are the military field that is most influenced by the geography of the land²². It is the armed forces that must propel their personnel across the terrain and the natural obstacles along the way²³. Physical geography will be a decisive factor for armed forces tactical measures and the way in which it shapes national strategy. Air power would not be highly influenced by the geography and terrain predisposition of the nation, but it plays a vital role in supporting land and sea operations.²⁴The landscape would also assist to establish a country's relationship with the ocean, the importance of its fleet, the vulnerability of the naval coast and the need for sea power²⁵.

Following Mackinder's understanding and reasoning, nations should not be 'trapped' into their geographical vulnerabilities, but should aim at exploring and creating better strategic opportunities²⁶. A good example would be the Republic of Singapore Navy, being regarded as 'the best little navy in the world'²⁷. It has been rated by American Defence analysts as the number one naval force in Southeast Asia²⁸. The Singaporean Navy's strength and power can be attributed to a new strategic approach whereby small fleets no longer need to abide in the shadows of larger navies²⁹. By investing in the latest technology, human capital and diplomacy, small fleets become strategically powerful forces in their region. This highlights the importance of policy makers and politicians in understanding a nation's geographical limitations, and in turning their weaknesses and vulnerabilities into strategic advantage.

The 'geopolitics' terminology became popular in the international political debate particularly after the Second World War and during the Cold War period. The 1945 Yalta Conference and the rise of the Soviet Union to political prominence had major implications

²² John Baylis, James J. Wirtz and Colin Gray (ed.) *Strategy in the Contemporary World: An introduction to Strategic Studies* (UK/ Oxford: Oxford University Press, YEAR), p.126.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Eliot A. Cohen, *The Meaning and Future of Air Power*. *Orbis Journal*, Spring 1995, (2)39, pp.189-200, p.190.

²⁵ Michael S. Lindberg, *Geographical Impact on Coastal Defence Navies* (USA/Illinois: Elmhurst College Press, 1998), p.39

²⁶ H.J. Mackinder, *The Physical Basis of Political Geography*, *Scottish Geographical Magazine* 6(1890), p.85.

²⁷ Michael Mulqueen and Deborah Sanders, *Small Navies: Strategy and Policy for Small Navies in War and Peace* (UK/ London: British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data, 2014), p.117.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ *Ibid.*

for the political dynamics and fight for world power³⁰. The colonial empires were dismantled and the United States and the Soviet Union became the two uncontested superpowers³¹. The Cold War *Realpolitik* and the fight for spheres of influence paved the way for the eruption of several new post war conflict zones³². Mackinder had predicted in the heartland theory that the centre of political gravity in the world would be shifted to Euro - Asia, arguing that '(...) *who rules East Europe controls the heartland; who rules the heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island commands the world*'.³³ However, it was the former United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger who reintroduced the terminology *geopolitics* into the international and strategic planning debate. Kissinger defined geopolitics as being 'an approach that pays attention to the requirements of *equilibrium*'³⁴. With *Realpolitik* and the geostrategic political game played by the United States and the Soviet Union, securing areas of influence consolidated a realist approach to international policy making³⁵.

Another important aspect of the superpowers national strategy program was their culture. Strategic options will enhance a country's political strength in the region, avoiding unnecessary political confrontation, promoting policies that will bring about stability in the region and secure state borders³⁶. It is not possible, however, to dissociate a country's culture from state behaviour and policy making³⁷. To understand fully a country's military strategy it is fundamental to take into consideration the socio-political and military technical aspects³⁸. Politics and the development of military strategy policies will be influenced by values deeply ingrained in their culture and society, which can be labelled as 'strategic culture'³⁹. Thus, states develop a particular approach to strategy that reflects to some degree common values

³⁰ Michael Dobbs, *Six Months in 1945: From World War to Cold War* (UK/ London: Arrow books, 2013), p.64.

³¹ Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, *We all Lost the Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p11.

³² Herman van der Wusten, *The Geography of Conflict since 1945*, in John O'Loughlin and Herman van der Wusten (ed.), *The New Political Geography of Easter Europe* (UK/London: Belhaven Press, 1993), p.70.

³³ Halford J. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (kindle edition), p.434.

³⁴ Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years* (Boston: Little Brown Press, 1979), p.914.

³⁵ Joyce P. Kaufman, *International Relations: Theory and Practice* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), p153.

³⁶ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, *The War Trap* (Yale: Yale University Press, 1981) p.30.

³⁷ Michael Evans, *Towards an Australian Way of War*. *Australian Army Journal: for the profession of arms* (1) 2, winter 2004, pp177-200, p177.

³⁸ Colonel David M. Glantz, *Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle* (NY/New York: Frank Cass, 2005), p.10.

³⁹ Alastair Iain Johnston, *Thinking about Strategic Culture*. *International Security*, (4) 19, pp.32-64, pp.32-64, p32.

shared by the people and their social elites⁴⁰. Finally, it is important to remember the role played by a country's world view in their national strategy. Understanding that each nation perceives the world through different lenses could be used as a means to predict other nations strategic planning⁴¹. Analysing a country's strategic behaviour through their culture and worldview can be an extremely useful tool and exploited as a strategic advantage.

Conclusion

In conclusion, a country's landscape and terrain produce an impact on border demarcation and the development of the military branches of a nation. Geopolitical considerations take into account geographical and regional challenges of a nation during the crafting of public policy and setting up the country's political agenda. However, geographical factors should not be seen merely as a physical constraint. Good strategic planning should aim at turning geographical and circumstantial weaknesses and vulnerabilities into a country's strategic advantage. This being so, it is crucial to establish the relationship between geopolitics, geography and strategy.

Mackinder's heartland theory is a key concept in understanding the political reasons behind strategic planning throughout the twentieth century. During the post- World War period and the Cold War, geopolitics and the *equilibrium* of world power became crucial factors for strategic considerations. The political game played by countries around the world to secure spheres of influences should be taken into consideration when designing a national strategic plan. By understanding the reasons and agenda behind other countries policy making and strategic planning would provide a better framework for domestic policy making.

⁴⁰ Ibid.34.


⁴¹ Harrison, Richard E. and Weigert, Hans W. (ed.) *New Directions and Skyways: World View and Strategy*, in *Compass of the World: A Symposium on Political Geography* (UK/London: George and Harrap & CO. LTD, 1949), p.45.

Finally, values deeply ingrained in a nation's culture and society are likely to engender a significant impact on a country's strategic peculiarities and tendencies. These social particularities would produce a singular culture and worldview that transpires into national strategy practices. It would be beneficial to study one's opponent strategic culture and worldview to predict future strategic plans, and exploit them as a strategic opportunities.

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BOOK REVIEW

Maestro John Monash: Australia's Greatest General
by Tim Fischer

Review by Colonel (Retd) Mike Brennan

The Honourable Tim Fischer AC, the former Deputy Prime Minister of Australia and the former Australian Ambassador to the Holy See was in Perth on 4th March 2015 to speak at the ANZAC Leadership Luncheon. He gave an outstanding address, focused on the great World War One leader General Sir John Monash.

Many books have been written on John Monash but Tim Fischer provides a fresh and unique perspective on Monash in his new book ***Maestro John Monash: Australia's Greatest General***. Tim Fischer is a former Army Officer and his experience across a range of senior political and diplomatic appointments gives him a unique perspective on Monash's fascinating life, and his exceptional achievements. Fischer's book is well written, balanced and easily digested.

One of the key questions that Tim Fischer sets out to answer is why this great World War One commander was not promoted to the rank of Field Marshal, post war, in recognition for his exceptional achievements. He suggests that both the World War One historian C.E.W. Bean and the Australian Prime Minister Billy Hughes downplayed Monash's service as an Army Corps Commander on the Western Front.

Monash was notable for the way that he planned and synchronized major battles in much the same way that an orchestra conductor leads an orchestra.

'A perfected modern battle plan is like nothing so much as a score for an orchestral composition, where the various arms and units are the instruments, and the tasks they perform are their respective musical phrases. Every individual unit must make its entry precisely at the proper moment and play its phrase in the general harmony.'

— John Monash

Tim Fischer concludes that it is not too late for John Monash to be posthumously promoted to the rank of Field Marshal and he lays out a process for this to be achieved.